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Abstract—In this paper, we present different authentication
schemes of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) Generation
2 version 2 (Gen2V2) in UHF mode. We model the anti-collision
management and evaluate it by simulation with OMNeT++. We
evaluate the overall performance of RFID Gen2v2 network in
terms of measurement of collisions and association time. We
present four main cryptographic suites of the Gen2V2 stan-
dard, namely XOR, AES128, PRESENT80 and CryptoGPS.
After their modelling and simulation, the obtained results allow
us to put forward the necessary time for each authentication
algorithms. The objective of this work is to show the impact
of the cryptographic suites used to ensure the authentication
of connected objects in the Internet of Things.
Index Terms—IoT, Gen2v2, passive RFID.
1. Introduction
Nowadays, the use of Radio Frequency IDentification
(RFID) system is widespread in various application such
as stock inventories and system automations. It is also
applied to logistics, access control, smart environment, and
healthcare. With the new paradigm of the Internet of Things
(IoT) the number of RFID system is increasing very quickly.
Indeed, RFID, especially Low Frequency (LF) and High
Frequency (HF), is a well known technology that has been
in use for at least 20 years.
Since October 2013, GS1 (Global Standards) has ratified
EPC Gen2v2, a new version of the widely used Gen2 Ultra
high frequency (UHF) RFID standard. Gen2v2 is backwards
compatible with Gen2 but adds new features mainly for
authenticating tags and readers as well as consumer privacy.
These new features ease the adoption of RFID especially
in application areas where the tag carries more information
than only its identity. UHF is now an established technology,
solutions can be reliably deployed for long read range, pas-
sive, and cheap. This new generation of tags is supported by
an alliance of manufacturers called RAIN (RAdio-frequency
IdentificatioN) [1].
The RAIN RFID Alliance is a non-profit organization
that promotes awareness, education, and initiatives to ac-
celerate the adoption of passive UHF RFID standards de-
veloped by GS1 (EPC Gen2) and incorporated by ISO/IEC
(18000-63) [2] in business and consumer applications world-
wide.
But, this technology presents several security weak-
nesses that can be of concern for the IoT. The main concern
is the security of the data collected by this system. This
information could be used against the owner if it is not well
protected. Most information’s leaks happen through passive
eavesdropping that could bring toward a man-in-the-middle
attack or a replay attack. An access to the physical tags
could also leads to RFID tags cloning.
Moreover, as RFID Tag can be widespread in the envi-
ronment, the information they provide is critical in regards
to the user privacy. Therefore, authentication mechanisms
have to be provided to prevent an unauthorized reader to
collect this information. This authentication process has to
be performed both by tags as well as by readers. In tag
authentication, a reader asks a tag to encrypt a message
using its stored secret key. If the reader is able to decrypt
the tag response, the tag is genuine. This approach can
be used to detect unauthorized or spy tags. Similarly, in
reader authentication, access to a tag is limited to legitimate
readers.
Gen2v2 does not define a single authentication method
in the standard. Instead, the standard Gen2v2 propose nine
authentication schemes based on cryptographic suites de-
fined in the ISO/IEC 29167 standard family [3], [4], [5],
[6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12]. The scheme to use depends
on the system under use. Some schemes target low power
consumption and quick authentication whereas others may
enforce more secure authentication.
In this paper four cryptographic suites among the nine
have been selected to measure the additional time induces
by the authentication mechanism during the tag associa-
tion process. We chose XOR[4] for its simplicity that is
suitable for low cost passive tags. AES-128[5] was chosen
because it is a cryptographic suite widely used by other
well-known technologies for embedded connected devices
like Bluetooth, Zigbee and LoRa [13]. Present-80[6] was
also selected because it is a lightweight algorithms that can
be used by devices with low computation resources. Finally
CryptoGPS [7] proposed by the French provider Orange has
been chosen because it offers a highly secure authentication
process.
Based on OMNeT++ [14] simulations, an evaluation of
the four above cryptographic suites has been performed to
identify how this additional security component may affect
the overall association process between a single reader and
tags.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses
on the basic concept and the current standard; Section 3 in-
troduces the different cryptographic suites that are available
in Gen2v2 standard to perform an authentication; Section 4
presents the performance evaluation of these cryptographic
suite based on OMNet++ simulation. Finally, Section 5
concludes the paper with a discussion and open issues.
2. Background
2.1. RAIN RFID Model
RFID Gen2v2 is the current standard for passive UHF
RFID tags. It defines every aspects of signalling, collision
management and up to the enhancement of security features.
The collision arbitration protocol implemented in the
standard is based on the Frame Slotted Aloha (FSA). In
Aloha, any device is free to send data whenever it is required
to do so. If collision happens, the device waits for a random
time and retransmits the data. Collisions could occur at any
time during the transmission. As a consequence, a 99%
completed data transmission could be corrupted by a col-
lision. This will require a retransmission of the whole data.
Slotted Aloha solves this issue by fixing a time frame where
a device can transmit its message. A device can only start to
relay the message at the beginning of the predefine time slot.
Therefore the collision can only happen at the beginning of
each slot reducing the unproductive transmission. The frame
slotted Aloha protocol gathers slots into a frame.
Problem exists when more than one tag are within the
reach of the reader and when they decide to backscatter
the signal simultaneously. This could results in unproductive
situations, where the signal collides and becomes unreadable
and the association process duration will increase.
2.2. Method Used for Collision Management
The collision management of Gen2v2 is similar to the
Gen2 standard. No modification has been made by this new
version. The Gen2 standard [15] introduces a Q parameter
and a slot number to improve the collision management.To
begin a frame, the reader choose a total number of available
slots for the whole frame. This total is defined as 2Q with
a maximum value of 15 for Q. The reader sets the Q value
for all tags within its reach. When a tag receives Q, it will
randomly choose a number of slots within the frame. In the
following, this number will be known as the ’slot counter’.
Figure 1 represents the RAIN RFID collision manage-
ment process that has been implemented in our simulation
model.
To deal with collisions, the standard [15] defines that
the reader should first send a value between 0 and 15 called
Q to all tags. Q defines the number of slots available to all
Figure 1. Gen2V2 Collision Management
tags. Upon receiving Q, the tag generates a random number
between 0 and 2Q − 1. This random number is used as a
slot counter. The slot counter determines the moment when
the tag should send back its reply. In order to go through
the given slot, the reader sends a QueryRep request so that
the tag has to decrease its slot counter by 1. The reader runs
through the tag at least 2Q − 1 iteration of the QueryRep
request. It is important to note that a tag only starts to
transmit when the slot counter is 0. However, if any collision
occurs during the respond backscattered, the reader will send
a QueryAdjust request to reset and restart the counter slot
from 0, and start to go through all the slot in the frame once
again.
Based on this protocol, the maximum number of itera-
tions depends on the number of collisions and on the value
of Q as presented as in Equation 1
Maximum iteration = collision number × 2Q (1)
Therefore, a high number of collisions will increase the
association time for all tags and then reduce the system
efficiency.
2.3. Efficiency
Studies such as Chen and Zhang in [16], Namboodiri
et al. in [17], Su-Ryun et al. in [18], and Harald in [19]
addressed the evaluation of Framed Slotted Aloha to manage
the anti-collision in RFID from a theoretical standpoint
relying on different mathematical models. In this paper, we
chose to model the frame slotted Aloha protocol and to com-
pare the theoretical efficiency found in these studies with the
simulated results that we have obtained. This comparison
will help to validate our implementation of frame slotted
Aloha so that it can be used as the underlying communica-
tion protocol in order to evaluate the different authentication
mechanisms provided by the Gen2V2 standard.
The Framed Slotted Aloha model has a maximum the-
oretical efficiency of 36%. The equation (2) represents the
efficiency of the system, where n is the number of tags and
N is the value of 2Q.
S =
n(1− 1
N
)(n−1)
N
(2)
Collisions happen although the slot number is big
enough. Indeed, a high Q value does not guarantee a
collision free environment. However, the higher the slot
number, the higher the total duration required to associate all
tags. Figure 2 represents the efficiency differences between
theoretical and simulation values. In both cases, for 20 and
100 tags, the Q value is shifted to the right by 1. For the
group of 20 tags the best efficiency is reached at a maximum
value of Q=5 instead of Q=4 for the theoretical value. For
100 tags density, the best practical efficiency is obtained
with Q=8 while the optimum theoretical value is with Q=7.
This theoretical value depicted in Equation 2 does not take
into account the use of QueryAdjust which restarts a new
frame when a collision occurs. Indeed, during simulations
we integrate the collision management by calculating N
(refered as Nsim) according to Equation 3.
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Figure 2. Efficiency for 20 tags and 100 tags
Nsim =
total slot offered
total collision occurred
(3)
The current standard does not define the utilisation of
Q in a specific manner. The Q value could remain static,
incrementing or decrementing. It is interesting to be able to
vary Q in a context where the number of tags rapidly evolved
over time. Indeed, this is particularly true when the Q value
is small and the number of tags increases. If the process does
not dynamically adjusts the Q value then appear numerous
collisions during the association. In our evaluation context,
we performed several simulation runs with a fixed number
of tags for each run, so a fixed value of Q in the same run.
The current Gen2v2 standard enhances the Gen2 stan-
dard with the introduction of security functionalities as
described as in [3] among which is authentication.
3. Authentication Cryptographic Suites
Several cryptographic suite is introduced to the existing
protocol. It applies several lightweight cryptographic such as
XOR [4], AES-128 [5], PRESENT-80 [6], CryptoGPS [7],
ECC-DH [8], Grain-128A [9], AES-OFB [10], ECDSA-
ECDH [11] and RAMON [12].
These cryptographic suites relates to the capabilities of
the passive tags to deal with security. This could prevent
unauthorized communication between the reader and the tag.
In the remaining of the paper, we choose to focus only on
the fourth first cryptographic suites as Elyptic curves are not
available on most RFID Tags currently available.
3.1. XOR
This authentication algorithm depicted in Figure 3 uses
the logical operation called the exclusive OR (XOR). In this
algorithm, the reader and all related tags share the same pre-
shared key (PSK) and a constant On. Verification is based
on the exchange value passed between the reader and tags.
The values come from an operation between the random
number(RN), the constant On and the PSK.
The reader starts the authentication process by sending
SRNi computed according to Equation 4 where RNi is a
64bit random number generated by the reader and On is a
constant of value 5555 5555 5555 5555h.
SRNi = (RNi+On)⊕ PSK (4)
When a tag successfully receives SRNi, it retrieves RNi
according to Equation 5. As a reminder, On and PSK are
shared by the reader and tags.
RNi = SRNi⊕ PSK −On (5)
Once RNi is known, tag calculates the total iteration of
’1’ in the binary value of RNi. By using the total iteration
value, it performs a bit-wise rotation to the left on RNi and
PSK in order to get both RNi’ and PSK’.
The tag finally computes SORNi according to Equation 6
and sends it back to the reader.
SORNi = (PSK ′ +On)⊕RNi
′ (6)
In order to verify the authentication process, the reader
computes RNi’ and PSK’ and performs both operations
depicted in Equation 7 and in Equation 8.
SORNi⊕RNi′ (7)
Figure 3. Tag authentication using XOR
PSK ′ +On (8)
The reader compares results from Equation 7 and Equa-
tion 8. As a consequence, the tag is authenticated if results
are identical.
3.2. AES-128
AES128 [5] is a variant of a symmetric block cipher
called Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) standardized in
ISO/IEC 18033-3 [20]. It performs a series of substitutions
and permutations. It is designed for very limited resources
environment and can be used as a basis for authentication
protocols. In Gen2v2, AES128-based tag authentication re-
lies on a challenge/response scheme.
Figure 4 depicts the authentication process. The authen-
tication starts with the reader (R) generating a 80bit random
number challenge. The reader broadcasts the challenge along
with a key identification (KeyId) to be used. When a tag
(T) receives the challenge, it encrypts the challenge with
the given KeyId. A 16bit constant ’C’ and a 32bit random
number are then concatenate to the encrypted result (IChal-
lenge). The tag finally sends the response to the reader.
Based on this response, the reader decrypts the response and
retrieves both ’C’ and IChallenge. The tag authentication is
considered successful if both values are identical.
3.3. PRESENT-80
PRESENT80 [21] is a symmetric block cipher using 64
bits data block with a 80 bits pre-shared key standardized
Figure 4. Tag authentication using AES128
in ISO/IEC 29192-2:2011 [22]. Gen2v2 uses this standard-
ized proposition as a cryptographic suite for authentication
purposes.
The overall authentication algorithm is a challenge/re-
sponse protocol similar to the one used in 3.2.
Figure 5 illustrates the overall process. In total, it per-
forms 31 rounds of substitution and permutation. In every
single round, tag performs an exclusive OR (XOR) of a 64
bits round key with the challenge (42 bits) sent by R. The
round key value changed for each round. The first round
key is the 64 most significant bits of the 80 bits pre-shared
key. To get the next round key, a 61 bit shift to the left is
applied to the current round key to get the new round key
as presented as in Equation 9.
roundKey1 = key79key78key77...key16 (9)
The outcome is then passed through a substitution box
(S-box) and a bit permutation box (P-Box). Finally, the
result is then sent back to the reader in order to be verified.
Figure 5. Tag authentication using PRESENT80
3.4. CryptoGPS
CryptoGPS [7] is a lightweight asymmetric identification
scheme based on pre-computed coupons from an elliptic
curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) based on Equa-
tion 10.
y2 = x3 + ax+ b (10)
Both reader and tags refer to the same elliptic curve E
with a field size of q, a base point P and a multiplier s. Any
random point V on E is equal to the multiple of base point
P as presented as in Equation 11.
V = −[s]P = (xv, yv) (11)
V is the public key and s is the private key. Due to
the complexity of the CryptoGPS calculation, tags uses
coupons, a set of (ri, Xi), with a precomputed data with
the size of ρ-bit string. The coupon must be used only once.
Figure 6 highlights the authentication process. To start with,
the reader sends an authentication command to the tag. If
a tag receives the command, it retrieves a coupon Xi of x
bytes length and sends it to the reader.
Figure 6. CryptoGPS Commitment Challenge Response (CCR)
When the reader receives Xi, it retrieves randomly c
from its list of challenge named Sc and sends it to the tag.
Tag checks if the challenge is an element of Sc. If c
is valid, it then computes y according to Equation 12 and
sends it to the reader.
y = ri + z ∗ s (12)
Upon reception of y, the reader can deduce the r′i value
according to Equation 13 where z=c.
r′i = y − z ∗ s (13)
With r′i; the reader can then find X
′
i and compare it to
Xi. If they are identical, the tag is then authenticated.
4. Model Evaluations
Previous simulation studies in RFID is done by Marino
et al. [23] using OPNET, and by Mota and Batista [24] using
jRFIDsim that is based on JAVA and R language. Both stud-
ies concentrated on looking at different implementation of
RFID MAC layer. These contributions howedo not integrate
authentication algorithms of Gen2V2 standard.
In our study, we decided to evaluate the impact of Q on
the authentication process and on the different cryptographic
suites presented in section3. To proceed with this, we choose
the OMNeT++[14] discrete event simulator. The first step
has been to implement a Frame Slotted Aloha and to com-
pare it to the theoretical analysis to enforce the validity of
results obtained during the authentication evaluation. This
validation has been presented in section 2.
To enforce the confidence in the simulation results, we
perform every simulation 30 times. In the remaining of the
section, the mean results as well as confidence intervals
are provided. Finally, to ensure that every cryptographic is
evaluated under the same conditions, the same seed is used
by random generators for every algorithms to evaluate. More
specifically as there are 30 runs, the same 30 seeds are used
for every algorithm. This control is needed to ensure that
collisions will occur on the same time slot for all algorithms
and therefore that they encounter the same conditions.
As a reminder, it must be noted that collisions occur
when several tags try to transmit during the same time slot.
In this case, the standard offers 3 different solutions:
1) The reader ignores the data received and recaps
with the rest of the slot.
2) The reader sends a command to the tag to re-
generate slot counters and restarts counting.
3) The reader restarts the communication with new
parameters.
In this paper, we choose to re-generate the slot counter
when a collision occur. The objective is to minimize the
total number of slots offered.
The communication scenario that has been used is rather
simple: A reader try to perform an association with every
tag within its communication range. When the association
is carried out, the reader try to authenticate every tag using
one of the cryptographic suites.
In the remaining of the section, we will first present the
overall performances of the scenario before focussing on the
impact of authentication.
4.1. Overall performances
The choice of the Q should depend on the number of
tags. A small Q offers a limited number of slots. But, when
this number is too low, the number of collisions will increase
leading to more retransmissions, hence the additional time to
accomplish the task. As an example, for 20 tags when Q = 2
only 4 slots are offered. As a result, the lowest number
of retransmission occurs when slot 1, 2, and 3 succeed to
associate a tag and the remaining is in slot 4. Even with the
best scenario, we need at least 6 retransmissions. Thus, the
same number of tags with a Q value of 1 will requires a
huge number of retransmissions.
Our first result represents the number of tag collisions
for different Q values. As depicted in Figure 7, the value of
Q has a direct impact on the number of collision a tag may
encounter. It reflects our expectation. The collision number
is decreasing over the value of Q. While the number of
tag is fixed, and the number of slots offered increased, we
should have a figure similar to 1
x
. Indeed, each group of tags
requires a minimum value of Q to prevent it from having
a high collision number. As an example, 20 tags with a
Q value of 1 will have difficulties avoiding collisions as
every tag’s slot counter can only be 0 or 1. Minimizing the
collision number requires that the number of slots is larger
than the number of tags. As an example, the smallest Q
value to accommodate 20 tags is 5.
Therefore, any value between 5 and 15 is suitable to
accommodate 20 tags. Of course, the efficiency will be
better with a small value of Q as depicted as in section 2.
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Figure 7. Simulated Gen2V2 collision by Q value
Figure 8 enforces this affirmation showing that the duration
to associate the group of tags increases when Q increases.
Hence, the negative effect of minimizing collision is the
increase of the total duration to associate all tags. But, a
small number of collision is better than a zero collision that
will reduce the performance of the overall authentication.
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Figure 8. Gen2V2 total duration of association
It is interesting to note in Figure 9 the correlation
between the number of collisions and the time required for
association. It must be understood that the more the value
of Q, the more the duration. This phenomenon is due to the
Q values that are greater than 7 leading to a number of time
slots greater than 128. This means that on the same frame,
the times slots are vacant and that the association process
should continue until the end of the frame.
The compromise Duration/Collision for 100 tags is a Q
value between 8 and 9. The compromise for 20 tags is the
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Figure 9. Duration vs Collision for 20 and 100 tags
Q value equals to 8. The value of Q = 8, with 256 time
slots, allows both the 20 and 100 tags’ association without
degradation of the overall network performances in terms of
collisions and useless waiting time.
4.2. Authentication performances
The objective of these simulations is to evaluate whether
tag authentication has in impact to the time performance of
a Gen2V2 tag system. We choose 4 different algorithms to
investigate the total duration to associate a group of tags.
The chosen algorithms are XOR, AES128, PRESENT-80
and cryptoGPS. A baseline is set by performing the tag
association without any authentication. Then, the algorithms
are tested based on the standard given in ISO/IEC 29167
variations. The duration to perform the authentication for
each algorithm is then compared to the baseline.
The simulation focusses on a group of 20 and 100 tags.
For 20 tags, we choose a Q value of 5 whereas for 100
tags a Q value of 8 will be used. Both of these Q values
are based on the figure 2 and depict the highest degree of
efficiency.
Figures 10 and 11 show the time induced by authen-
tication schemes after the association phase.
The curves in Figure 10 for 20 tags illustrate the average
time needed to perform the association of every tags. It
takes about 1.2s to associate 20 tags without authentication
while an additional 0.5s is necessary for the authentication
with cryptographic suites. For the authentication based on
CryptoGPS, we managed to distinguish an additional time
that is linked to the mutual authentication between the
reader and the tag as presented as in section 3.4. Figure 11
illustrates the results obtained for 100 tags. The shape of the
curves is identical to the 20 tags’ curves with a scale factor
of 5 that is proportional to the evolution of tags numbers
(i.e from 20 to 100).
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Figure 10. Total duration for 20 tags including authentication
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Figure 11. Total duration for 100 tags including authentication
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we presented results of the evaluation
of a RFID tags network based on Gen2v2 RAIN RFID
standard. This network has a star topology with a single
reader and several UHF RFID Tags disseminated within
a radius of a hundred meters. In addition to the tradi-
tional identification of a tag by a reader, standard version
2 provides authentication mechanisms of both reader and
tags to improve network security. Fake or spy tags and
readers can no longer connect to this type of RAIN RFID
network. In this work, a performance evaluation of several
cryptographic suites is performed to evaluate the impact of
this additional security feature that is authentication. Due to
the lack of RFID Gen2v2 stack simulation models in well-
known simulators, we have first modellized the collision
management protocol based on Framed Slotted Aloha (FSA)
on OMNeT++. Simulation results of the efficiency have
enabled us to validate this basic model measuring the impact
of collisions and of execution time with regards to the size
of the frames (and thus the number of slots). Four patterns
of authentications among the 9 standard were presented,
then modelled and simulated with OMNeT++. We wanted
to highlight the necessary time to the authentication phase
of cryptographic suites XOR, AES, PRESENT and Cryp-
toGPS. These evaluations have helped to show the impact of
time required for the authentication process to be considered
for secure applications conformed to RFID RAIN standard.
The evaluations were considered in an environment with
a variable number of tags but with a single reader. Our
short-term prospects aim to consider several readers and a
dynamic use of the frame size to deal with the number of
tags variability. The inclusion of these parameters aims to
integrate a tag location information and ensure privacy when
tags will worn by people.
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